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is means that, if the rm unilaterally increases its prices, it will lose some but, crucially, not all of its sales. is gives it some power over price. Many real world rms therefore have some market power and at the same time face competition from rivals. To be regarded as dominant, a rm, or group of rms, besides having su cient market power, it must be able to raise price or act in some other way independently of its rivals.
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A dominant rm, however, may face competition from other rms. A dominant rm is typically much larger than its rivals. ese smaller rms could achieve large increases in pro tability by competing aggressively with the dominant rm. 3 It follows, that a dominant rm may have to face tough competition which may require tough responses from the dominant rm. e relevant question in this respect is that where is the borderline between harsh but genuine legal competitive measures and the abuse of that dominant position. In this paper we ask this question concerning only the allegedly predatory pricing behaviors of a dominant rm.
Predatory pricing generally involves three equally important parts: -e company applying that policy has to be in a dominant position. -e strategy must involve pricing, usually charging bellow cost prices, which usually leads to a signi cant loss. -A special market environment into which competitors may nd di cult to enter or reenter a er the dominant rm will successfully eliminated its existing competitors which enables it not only to regain (recoup) its former losses but to make extra pro ts in the future.
The Basic Economics of Predatory Pricing
e traditional theory of predatory pricing envisions two stages in carrying out the predation strategy − the predation stage and the post-predation stage. In the predation stage, the predator prices its product below some measure of economic cost − typically incremental cost − with the intent of driving its prey from the market. In the post-predation stage, the prey leverages the absence of meaningful competition to price its product at supracompetitive levels, thereby recovering the losses incurred during the predation stage and earning monopoly pro ts therea er (McGee 1980) . e consensus view in the literature, and this is a view that has prevailed for several decades now, is that traditional predation is di cult and hence frequently irrational. Because rms will re-enter the market when the predator commences pricing at supracompetitive levels, recoupment of the losses incurred in the predation stage is virtually impossible. Hence, in order for the predation strategy to be successful, there must be some type of barrier to entry that precludes entry from occurring when the predator prices at supra-competitive levels (Joskow and Klerovick 1979) .
Traditional predation is likely to be particularly di cult in regulated network industries due to the high-proportion of sunk costs and the fact that productive capacity typically does not leave the industry even if particular competitors should exit the market. In other words, productive capacity in the industry serves as a check on supra-competitive pricing. Consequently, even if predation should succeed in driving a particular competitor from the market, the (independent) productive capacity that the competitor leaves behind continues to discipline pricing (Weisman 2002) .
Starting as early as 1980's, in concert with important developments in game theory, a number of modern, strategic theories of predation have emerged. ese models, which include nancial market predation, reputation models and cost signaling models, 4 generally require conditions of asymmetric information. In other words, the predator has information that its prey does not, and it leverages this informational asymmetry to drive the prey from the market or to deter its expansion into new markets. In other words, the predator has information that its prey does not, and it leverages this informational asymmetry to drive the prey from the market or to deter its expansion into new markets.
In the case of nancial market predation, the prey is dependent upon some source of external nancing. e focus is on the relationship between the prey and its investors. e predator tries to manipulate that relationship. For example, the predator may reduce prices in order to reduce the pro tability of its rivals. e rival's investors view this decrease in pro tability as a signal that prospects in this market are limited and decide to decrease nancial support accordingly. In this model, investors are unable to di erentiate between the predation campaign and managerial incompetence (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000:54) . Telser (1966) set out a model of the "long purse" in which predation occurs because the predator, with superior resources, can outlast the prey. In Telser's model the interest rate at which a rm can borrow increases as the rm's reserves decrease, which in turn constrains the amount a rm can borrow. In order to remain viable, rms must incur per period xed costs even if they do not produce any output. Because this is common knowledge, the predatory rm can calculate the number of periods its prey could last given predatory prices. Under these conditions, a rm with greater resources can successfully deplete the reserves of the less capitalized victim, thus limiting the victim's ability to borrow and eventually driving him from the market. If the additional monopoly pro ts outweigh the predator's reduced pro ts that result from predatory pricing, predation is a rational strategy vis-à-vis a policy of entry accommodation. However, because all information is common knowledge, predation would not be observed in equilibrium. Because predation is costly to both rms, Telser suggests that the threat of predation should either deter entry in the rst place or result in the parties agreeing to merge, with the terms determined by the relative costs of predation in the absence of an agreement. Moreover, if potential victims anticipate this, they can alter their capital structure to increase the cost of successful predation, and thus favorably alter the buyout price (Kobayashi 2000:16) . Beniot (1984) also modeled predation with a nancially constrained entrant. Beniot rst presents an in nitely repeated extensive form game where the entrant has resources to survive a nite number of price wars. Under complete and perfect information, Beniot derives a "reverse chain store paradox" result, where entry is deterred as long as the entrant's ability to survive is nite. He then examines a game with incomplete information where the predator knows the maximum number of periods the entrant can stay in, but only knows with probability whether the entrant is committed to stay in the industry until bankrupt. Beniot derives a mixed strategy equilibrium where entry occurs, with entry being an increasing function of the entrant's nancial staying power. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) created a model where the entrant is uncertain about his per period xed costs and uses current pro ts to decide whether to remain in the market. Given this, the incumbent has an incentive to use predation to reduce the entrant's pro ts in order to cause the entrant to infer that he has high costs and should exit. eir "signal jamming" model can also be applied to lenders' decisions to make or limit outside nancing. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) derive nancial constraints based on rms' attempts to control agency costs. In their model, lenders' decisions regarding external nancing are sensitive to a rm's short term performance. is gives managers incentives and addresses manager shareholder agency costs. However, a predator knowing this relationship between a rm and its lender can take advantage of it by using price predation to lower current pro ts, which in turn reduces external nancing and induces exit. If these contracts between rm and lender are observable, rms that are potential victims of predation will choose to make their contracts less sensitive to current performance, thus trading o higher agency costs for a lower threat of predation. e use of nancial contracting by potential victims to reduce the threat of predation, and the e ect of renegotiation on its e ectiveness is further examined in Snyder (1996) . e reputation predation is based on a type of signaling that the predator seeks to gain a reputation for "toughness" and a strong willingness to defend its market at virtually any cost.
e predator reduces prices in one market to induce the prey and other potential entrants to believe that the predator will cut price in other markets or in the predatory market at a later time. e predator seeks to establish a reputation as a price cutter, based on some perceived special advantage or characteristic. us, a predator trying to establish a reputation for nancial predation cuts price when it has superior nancial resources (and when the other conditions for nancial predation are present) (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000:74) .
A set of studies examined reputation models where the assumption of perfect information was relaxed as a way to avoid the logic and result of the chain store paradox. , Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) developed models where some incumbents prefer to engage in predation rather than accommodating entry. Such preferences can result from the fact that predation is more pro table than accommodation in the single market setting, or alternatively from a narrowly irrational preference for predation when it is not. e entrant in these models does not know ex-ante what type of incumbent he is facing, strong (those with a preference for predation) or weak (those that would prefer to accommodate entry in a single market game) (Kobayashi 2000:19) .
In this models, the predator reduces its prices in order to signal to its rivals that he is a tough competitor and that opportunities for positive returns will be strictly limited either in other markets or in the predatory market in the future (Weisman 2002:5) It is important to note, however, that this theory may not be completely robust. Although economic theory views reputation e ect predation as a separate and distinct predatory strategy, a reputation e ect theory based on irrational toughness may be too easy to assert and too di cult to prove (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000) .
In the cost signaling predation the predator wishes to signal its rivals that it is a low-cost rather than a high-cost provider. Rivals will enter the market if they believe the dominant rm is a high-cost provider, but will not enter the market or will choose to exit the market if they believe the dominant rm is a low-cost provider. In cost signaling a predator drastically reduces prices to mislead the prey to believe that the predator has lower costs and to exit the market. More speci cally, a predator trying to establish a reputation for low cost cuts price below the short run pro t-maximizing level. Observing the predator's low price, the prey rationally believes that there is a least some probability that the predator has reduced costs. is lowers the prey's expected returns and causes the prey to exist (Bolton, Brodley and Riordan 2000:100) .
A few other theories have also been published o ering alternative explanations to predation with less signi cance. e theories of predation discussed above all rely on asymmetric information to generate rational equilibrium predation. However, asymmetric information is not a necessary condition to generate predation in equilibrium. Cabral and Riordan (1997) have a learning curve model of equilibrium predation, in which rms' current period production costs are a function of the cumulative production. In such a learning curve environment, Cabral and Riordan show that rational predation occurs in equilibrium, where the predator expands output and lowers price in order to further take advantage of the learning curve cost reductions and to induce its rival's exit. is predation can involve, but does not require, below-cost pricing. e welfare consequences of such learning curve predation are ambiguous. Marx and Sha er (1999) have a complete information model of predation in intermediate goods markets. In their model, a manufacturer makes sequential purchases from two suppliers of di erentiated inputs. ey show that below-cost pricing of marginal units by the rst supplier can facilitate rent extraction from the second, resulting in a higher joint surplus between the buyer and the rst supplier. In their model, belowcost pricing does not result in exclusion, and welfare may increase or decrease (Kobayashi 2000:17-18) .
Predatory Pricing in the US Legislation
Predatory pricing has a long history in competition law dating back to the US Standard Oil case in 1911, so the United States has a rich history of both statutory and case law that treats issues of price predation. e legal history of predatory pricing in the U.S. can be divided into three periods. During the rst period following enactment of the Sherman Act, claims of predatory pricing were taken quite seriously (Calvani 2000) . Indeed, the predatory tactics employed by John D. Rockefeller and the "Standard Oil Trust" are part of American folklore (Tarbell 1904) . e Standard Oil Case (1911) became the paradigm. It was widely believed that Standard Oil were successfully able to drive competitors from the marketplace by temporarily selling below cost. Once achieved, these rms would raise prices above a competitive level and use those monopoly pro ts to nance predation elsewhere until they had taken over the entire marketplace. 5 In as early as in the fifties some economists had started to question whether Rockefeller and his company ever actually engaged in predatory pricing, see for example McKee (1958) .
is view reached its zenith in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. Case. Utah Pie Co (the plainti ), a leading vendor of frozen pies brought suit against three national bakeries alleging that they had increased their market share by predatory pricing. Finding that the national bakeries sought to increase their market share above their combined 28 percent, the Court concluded that they charged less for their pies in the plainti 's market than they did elsewhere. Indeed, during the fortyfour month "price war", the plainti 's market share decrease to 45%. e Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict for the plainti notwithstanding evidence that the plainti 's sales volume had increased during the relevant period and that it had continued to make a pro t. While the U.S. Court did not address the speci c de nition of "below cost" sales, it maintained that average total cost was the appropriate standard. Su ce it to say that predatory pricing cases of that era were characterized by the relative large size of the alleged predator, geographic price discrimination, sales below average total costs, and predatory intent (Brodley and Hay 1981) .
e second period began with the publication of a two Harvard Law School professors Donald F. Turner and Philip Areeda which radically changed the U.S. approach to the subject (Areeda and Turner 1975) . eir important article o ered a cost-based rule for determining whether or not a pricing strategy is predatory. Under the Areeda-Turner test, prices can be found to be predatory only if they are below marginal cost or, if that cannot be determined, below average variable cost.
Areeda and Turner observed that predatory pricing is not common. Nonetheless, they concluded that predatory pricing is still a subject for legitimate concern to antitrust policy makers as long as great care is taken not to deter vigorous competition. " at predatory pricing seems highly unlikely does not necessarily mean that there should be no antitrust rules against it. But it does suggest that extreme care be taken in formulating such rules, lest the threat of litigation…materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing. " 7 Areeda and Turner develop their rule from an analysis of the short-run, static model of the rm used in all introductory price theory textbooks. According to the textbook theorem, marginal cost pricing leads to a proper allocation of resources in the short run and claiming that the only explanation for below-marginal cost pricing is exclusionary intent, Areeda and Turner suggest that a price below "reasonably anticipated" short-run marginal cost is predatory unless at or above average total cost. Since data on marginal costs are di cult to obtain, average variable costs, which are much easier to ascertain, should be used by the courts as a proxy for marginal costs in the above formulation, unless average variable costs fall signi cantly below marginal cost in the relevant range of output (Calvani and Siegfried 1988:279-82) .
Since then − for quite a long time − almost every Court of Appeals in the United States has accepted some form of the Areeda-Turner test (Hurwitz and Kovacic 1982) . One of the problem with the Areeda-Turner cost-based test is that it is not easy to apply in reality. e determination of which costs are variable is a function of the jury. is means that pretrial discovery and the trial itself are o en taken up with laborious and di cult issues of cost characterization and expert testimony on those points (Calvani 2000:6) . e third and latest period started with the 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. e case involved a pricing battle between egg producers. e plainti 's expert economist had testi ed at trial that the defendant's prices were below its average total costs and less than its average variable costs for a period of time. Moreover, the cost data were accompanied by executive comments evidencing predatory intent. Some of the more colorful ones included: "We are going to run you out of…business. Your days are numbered. " 8 Recognizing that application of a price/cost standard is "di cult business, the court stated that one should rst consider the likelihood that the predator would be able to recoup its predation costs. " 9 Predatory prices are an investment in a future monopoly, a sacri ce of today's pro ts for tomorrow's. e investment must be recouped. "If a monopoly price later is impossible, then the sequence is unpro table and we may infer that the low price now is not predatory. More importantly, if there can be no "later" in which recoupment could occur, then the consumer is an unambiguous bene ciary even if the current price is less than the cost of production. Price less than cost today, followed by the competitive price tomorrow, bestows a gi on consumers. Because antitrust laws are designed for the bene t of consumers, not competitors…, a gi of this kind is not actionable".
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Because determination of likelihood of recoupment is easier than undertaking the price/cost characterization and comparison, the court held that trial courts ought to undertake the recoupment analysis rst. If recoupment is implausible, then one need not undertake the laborious price/cost exercise.
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"Market structure o ers a way to cut the inquiry o at the pass, to avoid the imponderable questions that have made antitrust cases among the most drawn out and expensive types of litigation. Only if market structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire into the relation between prices and cost. "
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Recoupment is a necessary but insu cient element of the plainti 's case. e court went on to state that intent ought play no role in assessing whether conduct is predatory (Calvani 2000:7) . Several reasons support that conclusion. "Firms 'intend' to do all the business they can to crush their rivals if they can... Rivalry is harsh, and consumers gain the most when rms slash costs to the bone and pare price down to cost, all in pursuit of more business... Entrepreneurs who work hardest to cut their prices will do the most damage to their rivals... If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as evidence of a forbidden 'intent' , they run the risk of penalzing the motive forces of competition. " 9 ie. 881, F.2d at 1400 10 ie. 881, F.2d at 1401 11 "It is much easier to determine from the structure of the market that recoupment is improbable than it is to find the cost a particular producer experiences in the short, middle, or long run (whichever proves pertinent)" i.d. 12 ie. 881, F.2d at 1401 13 ie. 881, F.2d at 1402 Radio Corp., the Court had accepted the economic approach to the question of recoupment by quoting Easterbrook (1981:263) : "...the short-run loss is de nite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess pro ts. e success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a signi cant period of time, the predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay o . " 14 e Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. also held that plainti must prove the likelihood that the alleged predator will be able to recoup the losses associated with its predatory pricing later. e Court reasoned that the unsuccessful predator (the rm that prices predatorily but is unsuccessful therea er raising prices above a competitive level) does not present an antitrust issue. While that rm may have made life miserable for rms within the market, consumers reap the bene t. Below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws a for the protection of competition, not competitors.
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We can conclude that, while predatory pricing remains actionable under U.S. federal law, the current caselaw is quite skeptical of the theory generally. On the one hand, it is rarely tried and even more rarely successful. On the other, the costs of inappropriate intervention are particularly high since consumers are denied the bene ts of tough competition. Current law accepts the cost/price tests suggested by Professors Areeda and Turner, which are not easy to satisfy. Moreover, the recoupment requirement imposed by the Court in Brooke Group requires plainti to demonstrate that there is a likelihood of recoupment before going forward. e universe of actionable cases in U.S. federal courts may not be a null set, but it is not large. Consumers are the bene ciaries of this change in the law (Calvani 2000:10) .
Predatory Pricing Cases in the EU with Respect to the Effects of the Areeda-Turner Principles
Allegations of predation also featured in the more recent Microso cases both in the EU and the US. It has usually something to do with special price cutting as a part of dominant rm's market strategy. Price competition involving price cutting or discounting is a normal part of competitive business behavior. Predatory pricing involves a policy of price-cutting by a dominant rm designed to eliminate competition so that the rm may reap higher pro ts at a later stage by charging higher prices once a competitor has been eliminated. In order to be successful this requires entry barriers to keep prevent new entry since otherwise it would not be possible for the predator to raise prices once its rival has been eliminated. e Areeda and Turner arguments meant to emphasize that predation only arises when prices are held below marginal cost. Recognizing that, in practice, measuring marginal cost may be extremely di cult, they argued that average variable costs could be used instead.
e Areeda-Turner rule is designed to restrain rms pricing behavior as little as possible re ecting the authors' view that predation is a rare phenomenon. It is therefore arguably overly restrictive. Nevertheless it has had interesting adverse in uence on the Commission and Courts in the EU. ese rules became a special test on the basis of which predation could be proofed without any serious considerations to other necessary requirements to establish a predatory case (recoupment, for example).
e Areeda-Turner test was rst applied in AKZO. In the resolution of this case, in December 1985, 10 million ECU ne was imposed on AKZO Chemie BV, a Dutch multinational chemical company for predatory pricing as an abuse its dominant position.
e appeal was rejected in 1991. As for the facts, in the EEC organic peroxides market AKZO applied a policy of selective and below-cost price cutting designed to damage a small UK producer, ECS Ltd. to exclude it as a competitor. It can be seen from the Court's judgment that the explanation of the cost-based test adopted in the case di ers from that of Areeda-Turner's. According to the court's reasoning, prices below AVC "must be regarded as abusive", because there could be no pro t-maximizing reasons behind them. e only explanation for them is that they are aimed to eliminate competitors.
e Commission found that AKZO was dominant in the organic peroxides market as a whole and had infringed Article 82 by pursuing a course of predation against ECS designed to drive it from the plastic sector. e Commission decision nding predation focused in AKZO's threats and its eliminatory intent. e decision did not adopt the Areeda-Turner rule or lay down speci c rules about the point at which low prices become predatory and abusive. It suggested that even prices above ATC could be predatory. AKZO appealed to the Court, and it accepted its arguments that some costs which the Commission had classi ed as variable were, in this case, xed.
e test in AKZO can be summed up as follows: Prices below AVC are presumed to be predatory. 1.
Prices above AVC but below ATC are not presumed predatory but are predatory if 2. they are part of a plan to eliminate a competitor.
Since the ECJ decision on the AKZO case issued in 1991, it has become not just on the guiding rule in predatory cases for competition authorities and courts but has become a subject of severe criticism from many economists.
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But it was rea rmed in TETRA PAK II and followed and applied by the CFI in France Télécom.
e Areeda-Turner test, as a cost-based criteria, are problematic. In this case, parties submitted very di erent calculations of AKZO's costs. e Court stated that a certain item in the cost list is not xed or variable by "nature", and overruled the Commission's classi cation of the labour costs as variable rather than xed. However, the Court did not give guidance on how costs are to be allocated in multi-product rms. For example, the Commission classi ed advertising costs as variable rather than xed, although AKZO insisted it to be. 17 e Court did also rejected any other explanations for pricing under AVC: for example the launch of new lines, obsolete stock clearance, or using continuous production facilities (Jones and Sufrin 2007:450) . It may be better for a rm (even one in a dominant position) to sell temporarily at a loss and make some return than to make none at all. In paragraph 71 the Court set out that circumstances like these are possible but not recognized any of them. In AKZO rules, the intention of the dominant rm became a crucial factor when prices are between AVC and ATC. e Court recognized that pricing at this range can be rational and non-predatory in certain circumstances. Ruling out all of these possibilities the Court laid out the test of intentions. According to that test, if the pricing behavior were a part of a plan intended to exclude deliberately and systematically a competitor from the market, that it is a su cient proof of predation.
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In AKZO, the Court did not address expressly the issue of recoupment. In the US, courts do not nd predatory pricing unless the plainti would be able to demonstrate that the alleged predator had a serious probability to recoup its investments in below-cost prices.
is rule comes from the BROOKE GROUP (1993) in which the Supreme Court stated that even if the plainti can show below-cost prices and a predatory intent, there will be no antitrust violation. e position concerning the issue of recoupment in EC law is di erent.
e principle laid down in AKZO and was con rmed in TETRA PAK II. Originally, the Commission did not found that Tetra Pak had had a reasonable chance of recoupment but the Court said that the Commission did not have to prove that Tetra Pak could recoup.
e AKZO-case has been dominating the predatory pricing cases since in the EU. e AKZO-rules state that if the costs of a dominant rm during a certain period of time has been set below the AVC, or proved then it has to be a proven case of predatory pricing without any further considerations, including recoupment as well. Commission ruled on that principle in several similar cases involving dominant integrated telephone companies providing access to their network for its competitors (the alternative ADSL-providers) and ADSL service to the costumers. ree major cases are to be mentioned: Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, and Telefonica.
In 2007 both the Commission and the Court maintained that approach. e Court of First Instance approved the former Commission's decision in the France Telecom case in January, and the Commission decided in the Telefonica case in June. Since then the Commission has been threatening several national incumbent telephone companies to launch investigation against them for similar exclusionary behaviors. In this paper I examine the question that whether the use of the AKZO-rule in exclusionary dominant cases can be substantiated by economic e ects of the alleged abuse and harming the consumer in the short run as well as in the long run.
In its Wanadoo decision of 2003, the European Commission applied the AKZO test and explicitly rejected the notion that recoupment of losses should be part of the test for predation. e Commission's approach was upheld by the Court of First Instance. Although many commentators considered this was inconsistent with contemporary economic theory and unnecessarily diverged from the analysis under US antitrust law, the Commission's Sta Discussion Paper of 2005 maintained that separate proof of (the possibility of) recoupment was not required to nd an abuse. Against this background, the Commission's Guidance appears to propose a blend of old and new theories. e Commission indicates it will generally intervene where a dominant rm engages in predatory conduct "by deliberately incurring losses or foregoing pro ts in the short term … so as to foreclose, or be likely to foreclose, one or more of its actual or potential competitors with a view to strengthening or maintaining its market power, thereby causing consumer harm" (Janssens 2009 ).
Despite the outpouring of academic writing in the area of predatory pricing in the last thirty years 19 , the courts on both sides of the Atlantic have remained adverse to new developments in economic theory in this area. It seems that AKZO (in Europe) and BROOKE GROUP (in the U.S.) remain applicable despite their evident shortcomings in terms of the below-cost test. Although it seems that in both cases the same test was applied, the consequences to future cases were quite di erent. In US, a er BROOK GROUP, plainti s have become more reluctant and cautious to bring a predatory case in the Court. At the same time, however, since AKZO Commission has become more and more active to try predatory pricing cases, on the basis of the AKZO rules. How could that happen? Is it because in the EU, economists seem to have much less in uence on the Courts that in the US? Yes, I think that could one a part of the answer. But the economic theory itself is not that clear on the subject.
Lawyers and judges have rarely been as dependent on economic theories to substantiate their arguments as in the area of predatory behavior; but given that the characteristics of predation -and indeed its very existence -are ercely debated among economists, it is no wonder that the legal community has been puzzled, and at times misled, by the numerous economic theories (and intense ideological activism) in this area. Can lawyers really be blamed, when economists suggest diverging or even atly contradicting theories about predatory pricing? (Ritter 2004) 
Alternative Tests Used in Predatory Cases
e economic literature provides a few suggestions how to test an alleged predation which can be used instead of the AKZO-rules. Joskow and Klevorick (1979) suggested a modi cations of the ATC test that require the existence of structural preconditions as a rst-stage lter. e rst set of factors to be examined include proxies for market power, such as the predator's market share, the size of other rms in the market, the stability of market shares, the predatory rm's pro t history, and the residual elasticity of demand.
e second set of factors to be examined are proxies regarding conditions of entry into the market. e third step would be to examine generally the dynamic e ects of entrants on the market conditions. If the structural analysis suggests little danger of successful predation, Joskow and Klevorick would preclude plainti s from pursuing such cases. In cases where the rst stage analysis suggests that predatory harm is possible, a price below AVC would be a su cient but not necessary to nd predation. In general, Joskow and Klevorick advocate a presumption of illegality for prices below ATC. Prices above ATC would be presumed legal unless the price cut was reversed within a reasonable period of time (for example, two years) (Kobayashi 2000:29) .
In an early article, Baumol (1996) notes that AVC is not well de ned. Baumol would use average avoidable costs (AAC) as the price oor, where AAC are de ned to include variable costs and all xed costs that are not sunk. Because a rm can minimize its losses by exiting whenever prices are below average avoidable costs (AAC), prices below AAC necessarily involve a pro t sacri ce. AAC, and not marginal cost, will also de ne the shut down point for an equally e cient rival. us, prices above AAC will not exclude an equally e cient rival, while prices below AAC will be exclusionary.
Bolton, Bradley and Riordan (2000) suggest a two tier test which would examine ve elements. In the rst tier, the plainti must prove: (1) a facilitating market structure; (2) a scheme of predation and supporting evidence; and (3) probable recoupment. Only if the plainti proves these three elements would the inquiry proceed to examine (4) whether price exceeded cost and (5) the absence of a business justi cation or e ciencies defense. While these elements are consistent with the traditional antitrust analysis of predatory pricing under BROOKE GROUP (see discussion below), each stage of this analysis can be accounted for any of the modern strategic predation models. For example, the rst stage analysis could incorporate reputation models of predation by creating a presumption of high entry and reentry barriers based on an incumbent's past reputation as a predator. Strategic theory would also allow the plainti a menu of alternatives as a basis for proving a scheme of predation. In addition, a coherent strategic theory supported by evidence would allow courts to apply a less demanding standard when assessing the probability of recoupment. With respect to the cost test, Bolton, et al. would adopt Baumol's AAC benchmark, or use long run average incremental costs (Ordover and Saloner 1989) .
Others have attempted to devise tests that would go beyond the cost based rules in an attempt to detect above-cost, but strategic, pricing. Instead of relying on the static relationship between price and cost to de ne predation, these authors use the intertemporal price pattern of a rm engaged in strategic pricing to devise a rule against predation. ese tests would allow aggressive pricing by the incumbent rm, but would seek to punish attempts to recoup the sacri ce of pro ts by making any price cuts "quasi permanent". Because the potential predatory rm would be required to su er the losses of non-compensatory price cuts or output expansions over the longer period de ned by the rule, such a rule would increase the costs of predation (Kobayashi 2000:31) . Edlin (2002) proposes a rule that would prevent an incumbent from reducing prices in response to entry accompanied by a substantial price discount. Limiting the rule to "substantial" price discounts would prevent weak entry. In addition, he argues that such a rule will better control above-cost exclusionary limit pricing, and will give better incentives for incumbents to lower their pre-entry price.
Elhauge (2003) notes that these dynamic predation rules that would restrict the incumbent's ability to react to entry are likely to be futile and harmful. Speci cally, incumbents' reactions to entry may be a normal and pro-competitive response when such entry will undermine an output maximizing competitive schedule of discriminatory prices. Even in the absence of competitive price discrimination, Elhauge shows that such rules can decrease both productive e ciency, and consumer welfare. Moreover, such rules are not well formulated to operate in real world markets, and would have unavoidable implementation di culties. ese di culties include the lack of well de ned price oors and ambiguities in de ning when entry or exit occurs. In addition, it is possible that these rules could increase the credibility of a multi-market predator and may serve to increase the probability that predation or entry deterrence is successful. Lang and O'Donoghue (2002) expressed some cautions against the strict requirement of recoupment. It is o en di cult to prove what a dominant rm could do successfully at an unspeci ed time in the future. In order to do that, it would be necessary to show that there would be no entry by more competitive and determined rivals, when the dominant rm increases its price. It would also be necessary to show that price of the product is inelastic in a sense that, although buyers were accustomed to low prices but they would be willing to pay signi cantly higher prices in the future.
We can agree with Areeda and Hovenkamp (2006:323) in the notion that "no shortage of theories, but a frightening inability of courts to assess them. " In the past two decades, scholarship on the economics of predatory pricing has evolved from the relatively settled consensus in which predatory pricing was thought to be irrational, rarely tried, and even more rarely successful, to a point where much less is settled. Recent theoretical work emphasizing strategic theory has shown that predation can be rational, and empirical studies have presented evidence consistent with successful predation. However, the literature's response to predatory pricing, a relatively administrable and permissive rule based in part on the assumption that successful predation was rare, has remained relatively intact. While the recent economic literature may have eroded this basis for the adoption of permissive standards for predatory pricing, other reasons for adopting such a rule, based on the bene ts of bright line rules that would be administrable by courts, still remain.
The France Télécom (Wanadoo) Case
In January 2007, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) handed down an antitrust Judgment in the case of France Télécom SA v Commission (France Telecom), addressing a number of issues relating to predatory pricing in the EU. By that ruling, an extremely strict and approach to EU law on predatory pricing has been con rmed. e CFI has declined to reject the Commission's form-based 'legal' approach instead of a more e ects-based analysis. is case was not helped by unhelpful internal documents and the inability of the parties to explain them away at trial.
For rms which may have market power, the road ahead remains fraught with di culties, particularly in relation to how they respond to aggressive competition. It is essential that clear contemporaneous evidence of legitimate business practices are kept and that documents which are liable to mischaracterisation (or worse) are not created.
While the calculations of prices and costs in the case were complicated by the particularities of the communications sector, the judgment provides guidance across all sectors. In particular:
e European Commission (the "Commission") has a broad discretion in selecting the appropriate accounting methodology. e onus rests on the applicant to show that the methodology adopted by the Commission is unlawful, and that its adoption amounts to a manifest error. It is not enough that another methodology was a credible alternative. e CFI's deference to the Commission's discretion in this regard has disturbing echoes to the approach it used to take in relation to the importance of economic assessments in antitrust cases. Where there is evidence of a strategy and/ or intent to foreclose, a dominant entity has no absolute right to match its competitors' prices.
All presentations by/documents from management will almost certainly be reviewed by a regulator looking for signs of predatory intent.
e fact that recoupment of losses is unlikely is no defense. However, it may be a relevant factor in considering whether there was an intention to predate.
In its 16 July 2003 decision, the Commission found that Wanadoo Interactive SA ("Wanadoo") had infringed Article 82 EC by charging predatory prices for its eXtense and Wanadoo ADSL services that, until August 2001, did not enable it to cover its variable costs and, a er August 2001, did not cover its total costs, as part of a plan to pre-empt the market for high-speed Internet access during a key phase in the development of the market.
France Télécom appealed the Commission's decision, claiming the Commission had inter alia:
applied a cost recovery test that was contrary to Article 82 EC both in relation to the costs taken into account and the methodology; taken an approach which denied France Télécom its fundamental right to align its conduct to that of its competitors; and made errors of law and manifest errors of assessment in nding that France Télécom had a plan of predation and that it was not necessary to prove that France Télécom had recovered its losses.
In this judgment, the CFI considered the cost recovery test applied by the Commission, and the methodology on which the nding of abuse rested. Having observed that the Commission must be a orded a broad discretion for complex economic assessments, the CFI reviewed the Commission's approach to calculation of both average variable and average total costs. e Commission accepted that, in an embryonic market, where customer acquisition costs represent a substantial proportion of expenditure, a provider cannot immediately recover its full costs. It therefore considered whether the revenues covered adjusted costs.
e CFI found that the Commission's calculation of costs, including its decision to spread customer acquisition costs across the estimated minimum subscription period, was appropriate, even though France Télécom itself did not depreciate the relevant expenditure in this way. Further, the CFI found that the Commission had correctly not taken subsequent reductions that were not foreseeable at the time of the alleged abuse into account in assessing recurrent costs at the time of the alleged abuse.
Finally, in relation to determining the appropriate methodology for calculating costs, the CFI considered France Télécom's argument that the only appropriate costing methodology was discounted cash-ows, noting that it is not enough to show that an alternative methodology could be appropriate, France Télécom would have had to show that the Commission's use of depreciated assets and costs was unlawful. France Télécom failed to do so.
In considering France Télécom's claim that the Commission's nding of predation had deprived France Télécom of the ability to meet its competitors' prices, the CFI found that a dominant entity has only a limited right to do so. e CFI noted that the only previous Judgment of the Court which described such a right referred to matching prices only in respect of a particular customer, not across the board. Further, the CFI noted that that previous Judgment had not ruled on the questions as to whether it is lawful to align prices where doing so would involve pricing below cost.
In considering precisely that question in this case, the CFI stated that a dominant undertaking cannot be permitted to take steps to protect its commercial interests if its purpose is to strengthen its dominant position. As a result, a dominant entity has no absolute right to align its prices to those of its competitors. Even if to do so is not in itself abusive or objectionable, it might become so when it is aimed not only at protecting its interests but also at strengthening and abusing a dominant position. As such, the CFI is sending quite clear signals that it will read the "meeting competition" defence narrowly.
In assessing the su ciency of the documents relied on by the Commission to establish that there was a predatory plan su cient to show predatory intent, the CFI noted that the impugned documents were from management-level sta and related to formal presentations and a detailed framework letter related to the decision-making process for France Télécom's business. In this respect, the Commission's tough approach to exclusionary abuses has been reinforced.
France Télécom submitted that if a dominant entity cannot reasonably expect to reduce long-term competition with a view to recouping its losses, it is not rational for that entity to engage in predatory pricing. In essence, it argued that unlikely recoupment of losses was a defense to predatory pricing. e CFI, referring to the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Tetra Pak II rea rmed that proof of recoupment is not a pre-condition to a nding of predatory pricing. However, the CFI's parting words regarding recoupment could be construed as implying that recoupment may be relevant in considering whether there is a plan to eliminate competition. It may be that the Commission needs to nuance the language in paragraph 122 of its discussion paper on the application of Article 82 EC to exclusionary abuses to re ect this potential evidentiary role for the likelihood of recoupment.
Mazák Standings on the Case
Advocate General Mazák has issued a call for less aggressive use of predatory pricing in his Opinion of 25 September 2008 relating to the France Télécom decision where the Commission found that the appellant charged predatory prices below variable costs (AVC) until August 2001, and above AVC but below average total cost (ATC) from August 2001 onwards, as part of a plan to pre-empt the market in high-speed internet access during a key phase in its development. Essentially the appellant should win on following grounds: 1) CFI failed to state reasons when commenting on a dominant rm's right to align prices 2) CFI failed to state reasons why recoupment need not be shown 3) Likely recoupment must be demonstrated by the Commission in predatory pricing cases 4) In addition the Mazák also said that in his view a dominant rm should, on occasion, be allowed to align its prices with those of competitors.
e CFI ruled that the rm's conduct was predatory (below AVC for a period and between AVC and ATC with intention for another period). erefore the pricing fell squarely withing the AKZO rules. So the behaviour is in itself abusive. Accordingly there was no need for the CFI to assess the formulation. In line with Community case-law, the Commission regarded as abusive prices below average variable costs. In that case, the eliminatory nature of such pricing is presumed. In relation to full costs, the Commission had also to provide evidence that France Télécom's predatory pricing formed part of a plan to 'pre-empt' the market. In the two situations, it was not necessary to establish in addition proof that France Télécom had a realistic chance of recouping its losses.
at all was a mistake, said Mazák. e Advocate General is calling for a major change in the law on below cost pricing, by placing a greater focus on the impact on consumer welfare and less on the economic freedom of market participants. e problem is that the case law which seemingly creates the basis for this shi does not support it. AKZO and Tetra Pak 2 are clearly cases where the dominant concern is the preservation of rivalry, of a competitive process. e radical change called for here should be made by advising the Court to change its approach rather than by asking the court to reinterpret its case law.
What can Economists Accomplish?
Realizing the problem initiated by the courts inability to assess complex economic theories, OECD held a Roundtable discussion on the subject in 2008 (OECD 2008). As a result, they concluded in several suggestion on the matter, which could, by all means, serve this paper as conclusions. In order to make courts to be able to handle economic theories during a deliberation of a case, competition authorities (including the European Commission itself) should recognize that maximization of consumer welfare is best achieved by a competition policy centered on the analysis of the likely e ects of rms' conduct. It also acknowledges that e ects analysis should be solidly grounded in economics. e growing acceptance of the importance of economics has been re ected not just in the enforcement practice of national competition agencies but also in the attitude of the courts. In particular, there have been increasing demands for substantial economic support for arguments advanced in a competition law context. By developing an enforcement culture based on economics at the level of the national competition authorities one encourages the acceptance of economic methodology by the courts; support was voiced for educating judges in economics and economic methodology. Such training represents a positive way to develop the judges' analytical skills. Given that in some jurisdictions judges may not understand the economics of the government's case and may seek out some procedural resolution in order to dispose of the case in a manner that does not require them to deal with the actual substance of the case, it is imperative that judges should be encouraged to become more sophisticated in competition economics. At the same time, judges should be informed of the limitations of economic evidence and that one that can rarely depend on uncontested data to produce a single numerical "solution" to a given problem; in terms of e ective techniques for the presentation of complex economic evidence, it is essential that the evidence be presented to the court in a way that is credible, simple and well-supported by the facts before it. e challenge here for the competition authorities is to present economic reasoning in an understandable but not less precise way to nonexperts, that is, judges. In order to ensure comprehensibility, the problem at issue should be clearly identi ed, and any economic argument should be put forward in such a way as to allow the reader or listener to easily follow it.
Inform the court of any assumptions relied upon as well as the reasons for determining parameters. Furthermore, advocates for the authorities should be ready to explain why other assumptions or parameters were not used. It is important to know and explain at trial the limits of the data that is relied upon. Any economic conclusions that are advanced at trial should be based on relevant facts and should draw on established economy theory (OECD 2008:8-10 ).
If competition authorities indeed share these views and act accordingly, cases to be presented to the courts will de nitely be more grounded with the solid base of economic theory, which is the ultimate reason why we have competition laws at all. In the cases of predation, AKZO rules shall be replaced by more sophisticated complex economic tests in the future.
The Need for Objective and Predictable Standards
As an economist, I cannot agree more with the conclusion of the previous section. But unfortunately, the views of an economist are not the only relevant views concerning predation. Let me nish this paper with some comments on the subject partially on a personal level. e importance of this issue will be evident to anyone who has had experience counseling a corporation that may be subject to an allegation of predatory pricing. at counselor's perspective is very di erent than that of a scholar or a government decision maker.
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Someone who works inside a company or advises a company may have to decide very quickly whether the company can legally cut a price, and if so, how much. ere is not enough time to do complicated economic studies. ere is not enough time to do a massive le search to see whether there are "bloodthirsty sentiments expressed somewhere in the bowels of the company"
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. ere is not enough time to recast the company's accounting system in order to accommodate the most sophisticated and nuanced expressions of an Areeda-Turner test.
Leary developed a simple test which could have farer reaching consequences. One practical approach, Leary suggested, was to ask business people inside a company whether they expected "to make any money" under the newly proposed prices. And if they asked "by what standard, " we would say by "your standard". e question is "do you anticipate that you are going to make any money, as you understand it, at this price?" If the answer was yes, then that may be enough. If the answer was no, then the next question is "why are you doing it?" at might yield some interesting answers. Based on his experience, we may have some presumptive standards which can be applied prospectively (Leary 2001) .
If we had to go beyond the cost-based standards, we can use the proposed test that the court addressed in American Airlines. is proposed test would require a determination of "whether the incumbent had clear alternatives that the incumbent knew or could reasonably be expected to have known would have made it more money absent any predation pro ts", American Airline (...). What does that mean? As soon as there is new entry or some kind of price action by a competitor, the pro t maximizing price of the dominant rm or any rm will change. And the pro t-maximizing price continues to change depending upon what that competitor or other competitors do with their prices, and depending upon how much business they capture. As a practical matter, the market's adjustment to a new equilibrium is likely to be an iterative process. If a plainti or a prosecutor were to claim that any price below this constantly changing pro t maximizing price is presumptively suspect, that would not only be impractical but also anticompetitive (Leary 2001) .
Another issue concerning whether the dominant rm can, at the least, meet competition. What is the established rm supposed to do if there is a new entrant building its market share? Is it supposed to continue charging its pro t-maximizing price on the assumption that the old competitive equilibrium still exist? Is there some kind of a market position that it has to give away to a new competitor? Is there any solid grounds on which it would be legally required to give away the new competitor a certain amount of market share? And even there were, how could we expect that a dominant rm could ne tune its market responses on that assumption.
Conclusion
As long as the AKZO rules will remain the decisive basis for ruling in predatory (exclusionary) pricing cases, you can tell several reasonable advises as a consultant to a dominant company based on the doubts and questions raised in this paper but it would probably not serve the best interests of the rm. You could discuss with your company each of the innovative proposals that have been proposed as alternatives or supplements to the traditional costbased tests for predation. But the AKZO rules not only prevailing in the EU but much more simple and easier to follow that any other alternative test.
ere are very serious theoretical and practical problems that will arise if we abandon objective cost-price tests that companies can apply up front. We should recognize that these tests may have to be modi ed or re ned before to apply but it is worth the e ort to do so. But the only hope of changing the prevailing dominancy of the AKZO test is that a dominant company will apply di erent approaches acting more aggressively with prices and will successfully be able to defend its behavior against the Commission and/or the Courts. Until then, the practical advises could go like these: be aware of your AVC all the time, keep your accountants knowledgeable about the di erent ways to calculate variable costs, do not set out your competition strategy expressly aimed against any of your competitors, and try to keep your prices very close to the AC. Does it seem rational to any one? Of course not but nor does the existing legislation in the EU concerning predatory pricing.
